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Europe lies in the delineation of boundaries in the Balkans on clearly ethnic lines, and the guaranteed freedom of the nations so disposed to develop each its own nationality undisturbed. In this solution the keystone is the formation of the new Serbia, or a "strong Southern Slav State," borrowing its territory largely from Austria and Hungary, but also from Italian ambitions and Rumanian and Bulgarian pretensions. Running south and southeast from the Drave and the Isonzo, the proposed "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" would include Dalmatia and the Adriatic coast to the present boundary of Albania, and would take in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the Serbia of 1914. The author's conviction is that in this strong state lies the only solution of the difficulties of the Balkans, and hence of Europe. This he defends most ably, and if all his arguments are not unanswerable, they are at least worthy of our close scrutiny. The people in the United States who have a clear comprehension of Balkan questions might very likely be numbered upon the fingers of both hands, yet these questions must shortly be settled either well or ill, and American public opinion must have a considerable share in their settlement. For those who understand their personal responsibility at least to form an intelligent opinion, Mr. Savich's book is warmly recommended.

**The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East.** By *Herbert Adams Gibbons, Ph. D., F. R. S.* 218 p. 1917. The Century Company, New York. \$1.00.

"Three years ago a writer could not get published in a big newspaper, much less in leading magazine or review, any article dealing with the possibility of the resurrection of Poland. I know," says Dr. Gibbons, "for I tried." Now we are so familiar with Poland's claims and the demands on her behalf that no governmental message is complete without specific mention of them. But, the author would insist, there is much that we do not clearly understand. Not intensively, yet ably, he runs over the chief points of Poland's right to sovereignty. The Balkan questions he discusses with a keen sympathy for the little nations of the Near East, but also with a sympathetic understanding of the Turk, a stabilizer with which many defenders of these nations do not outfit their cerebrations. Dr. Gibbons' book is easy reading, digestibly informative, and inspiring to further study. His final chapter on "The Monroe Doctrine for the World" will lend strength to the good right arm of any American who enjoys patting himself on the back.

**The Russian Revolution.** By *Alexander Petrunkevitch, Samuel Northrup Harper, and Frank Alfred Golder, and The Jugo-Slav Movement.* By *Robert Joseph Kerner.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 109 p., with appendices. 1918. \$1.00.

The complete failure of the Bolsheviks to represent the proletariat truly, the failure of all Russian leaders to interpret effectually the spirit of the times, the opposition of the Bolsheviks to faithful attempts at popular representation and their repeated obstruction of honest efforts to organize the vital forces of the country into an operative government with a consistent policy—these are the topics of the first two essays upon the Russian situation, the first by the son of a leader of the Russian Constitutional Democracy, the second by a close student of Russian affairs. Mr. Golder, the third contributor to the first portion of this book, was fortunate enough to be in Petrograd in pre-revolutionary days, when all that was yet grasped by the man in the street was a threatening of anarchistic trouble-making. He gives here a brief but illuminating picture of the events prelude to the Russian Republic. The three essays together give interesting sidelights on this greatest event of the war.

A most readable and shrewdly interpretative elementary text-book is the essay forming the second half of the book. The story of the Southern Slav Movement is one deserving of epic treatment, but is by no means belittled in the brief outline provided by Mr. Kerner. Here is a drama of twelve centuries' duration, sweeping down from the height of national unity in a tribal people to the depths of national decomposition, to the ignominy, impotence, and

serfdom of the years 1868 to 1905, and then back up to unity again, and the promise, yet to be fulfilled, of the new Pan-Slavia, or, in the language of the Pact of Corfu (July 20, 1917), "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." Three peoples, impermeated severally by three mutually antagonistic religious beliefs, have now by the outbreak and progress of the war been welded into one people again, and one which, in the writer's words, "is neither a doctrine nor a dream, but a reality," and "can help to make impossible the dream of mid-Europe or of Pan-Germany." For a rapid survey of the development of the southern Slav situation this essay is admirable, forming a readable and impartial introduction to the closer studies of the situation such as are presented in the book reviewed elsewhere in these columns, "Southeastern Europe."

**The Russian Problem.** By *Paul Vinogradoff.* E. P. Dutton & Company, New York. 44 p. 75 cents.

This is a most grateful book, fanning the reader's fevered brow with cool winds from forgotten caverns of pre-Kerensky days. Then, the "Russian problem" was the simple affair of the gradual evolution of constitutionalism that the writer here describes. The Russian omelet was still in the shell, and one had only to watch the sand-dial to make shrewd guesses as to its progress. Now that it is direfully scrambled, the conservative remark of M. Vinogradoff, for example, that "the future of Russia depends on the essentially peaceful process of democratic enlightenment and economic improvement," seems refreshingly naive. Yet—if we may leap far from our metaphor of the breakfast table—if, as some hold, revolution is but the eruptive purging of the inner malady, which will pass and leave the patient to revert in the main to the former steady development of national health, this book, and others like it, may well have a peculiar value just now, giving us a clearer view of what lies behind the uneasy manifestations of these days. M. Vinogradoff said far more than he knew in calling the war Russia's "*Befreiungskrieg*." But one is inclined to find much hope in his definition of the one quality in the Russian that will be his salvation: "He is longing to serve a great idea and to merge his insignificant self in a common cause. He is by nature a crusader."

**The World War and the Road to Peace.** By *T. B. McLeod.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 126 p. 1918. 60 cents.

This book is typical, in its earnest, honest blindness, of that well-meaningness in Christianity today that coddles the short-sighted and makes the "man at the front" (whether at home or in France) swear softly, albeit respectfully. Dr. McLeod wants us to be the right sort of pacifists, which are not "pacifists" at all, but stern Samaritans. Therefore he is moved to blow away the chaff of "pacifist" pretensions and reveal the good grain of righteousness—if not quite self-righteousness. Dr. McLeod sees the war as an outbreak of madness on the part of Germany. He sees our participation in the war almost solely as the noble effort of a great people to fly to the rescue of trampled Belgium. In this exposition he is somewhat hindered by the fact that our flight was not quite spontaneous. His picture of our President as the "great humanitarian" is thus a good picture, but a poor likeness. Our opinion is that from pages 30 to 76 this book is pretty good reading. On page 77 Dr. McLeod shocks us by talking of "compensations." It thereafter becomes despairingly manifest, as we had begun to fear, that the good doctor sees the war as nothing more than a sort of unfortunate "bull-in-the-china-shop." A deuce of a mess; we have to wade in and clean it up, no matter what it costs; it may seem to cost a lot, but—there are "compensations"! "Moral glory," whatever that is, is one. We hope "moral glory" means "consciousness of right"; but it sounds perilously like "self-satisfaction." Other compensations are national unity, the obliteration of "irritating" social distinctions, renewed interest in "consecration to service," and—yes—"economy." Save the mark, we are out for compensations for fighting this war, and one of the things that we are consecrating ourselves for is "economy"!